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Addressing the challenge that non-human cognition poses to collaborations between 
enactivism and Heideggerian phenomenology 
 
Marilyn Stendera 
 
 
The discourse generated by interactions between phenomenological and scientific 
perspectives is characterised by a particularly rich exchange between the specific and the 
general, the foundational and the applicative. That is, discussions about the insights produced 
by particular collaborations often feed into and enrich (rather than only occurring in 
succession to) debates over fundamental questions about the very possibility of any genuine 
cooperation between these discourses. The dialogue between phenomenology and the 
sciences seems to recognise almost more than any other that the conditions of its existence in 
general can come into view much more clearly in light of the challenges and benefits that 
arise in the context of specific negotiations.  
 The present chapter seeks to take advantage of this dynamic. It will examine how one 
particular proposal for interdisciplinary collaboration deals with conflict between the 
perspectives that it asks to cooperate, in the hope of shedding some light on the kinds of 
negotiations that make for fruitful dialogue between the phenomenological tradition and the 
natural sciences more generally. The proposal in question – a call for sustained cooperation 
between Heideggerian phenomenology and the enactivist approach to cognitive science – is 
one that I have set out and defended in detail elsewhere; hence, for the purposes of this 
chapter I shall proceed as if such a partnership is both desirable and possible (at least in 
principle).1 While I will offer a very brief outline of the intersections between Heideggerian 
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and enactivist perspectives that motivate these claims, I want to look at some of the 
challenges and opportunities that arise once this project is already underway and its 
interlocutors think that there is something in it that makes further negotiation a better option 
than simply abandoning the venture. The specific site of conflict that I shall focus on here is 
generated by the differences in scope between Heideggerian and enactivist analyses. That is, 
the parts of Heidegger’s account that I want to bring into contact with enactivism analyse the 
structures of one particular entity – Dasein – while enactivism investigates features belonging 
to a very broad range of systems, which might lead one to question whether these 
perspectives have much of interest to say to one another. It is my contention that they do. 
While I cannot comprehensively address this problem in such a short piece, I shall here put 
forward one kind of approach that I think may work if developed further. I will suggest, 
moreover, that this proposed solution not only benefits the Heideggerian enactivist 
collaboration, but also offers resources that can enrich how each individual discourse 
responds to significant debates arising within its native context. In doing so, I hope to 
illustrate some of the conditions that facilitate productive, rather than competitive, 
negotiations between phenomenological and scientific frameworks. 
 
1.  Preamble: Intersections between Heideggerian and enactivist perspectives 
The collaborative project I am referring to here is one that brings together Heidegger’s early 
analyses of Dasein’s purposive and intrinsically temporal Being-in-the-world with the model 
of cognition that developed out of Varela and Maturana’s theory of autopoiesis.2 Before 
exploring how it might negotiate one potential conflict, I want to summarise why I think this 
partnership is an inviting prospect in the first place. To this end, I will run through some of 
the main claims that I have made in previous work, focussing on what I take to be three 
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significant points of intersection between the discourses; constraints of space mean that I can 
only sketch each link very roughly here.  
 One anchor mooring my claim that we ought to set up a more sustained dialogue 
between Heideggerian and enactivist thought lies in the history that they have already shared. 
The ancestors of each discourse, so to speak, had significant contact with one another – a fact 
that has been studied in various other fields, yet rarely been brought to bear upon 
contemporary exchanges between enactivism and the phenomenological tradition. A prime 
example of this lies in the Heideggerian connections to the work of enactivism’s 
philosophical forefathers, Hans Jonas and Jakob von Uexküll.3 Jonas was, of course, a 
student of Heidegger’s. More than this, he also famously engaged in an extensive critique of 
Heideggerian thought, one that revealed the close connections as well as tensions between 
their approaches – as well as a resonant repudiation of Heidegger’s actions. Meanwhile, 
while we know less about what von Uexküll might have thought of Heidegger’s ideas, we do 
know what the latter thought of the former. In The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 
Heidegger described von Uexküll’s work as one of the most important advances towards 
bringing biology and phenomenology closer together.4 He went so far as to suggest that von 
Uexküll’s work invited a phenomenologically-driven “radical interpretation” that would 
enable it to realise its “fundamental significance”, and affirmed that “the engagement with 
concrete investigations like [von Uexküll’s] is one of the most fruitful things that philosophy 
can learn from contemporary biology.” (Heidegger 1995, 263/383)  
Beyond these historical connections, I also suggest that there are notable resonances between 
the content of Heideggerian and enactivist approaches. One of these lies in the way that each 
perspective describes the relationship between the entity at the centre of its narrative and the 
world that this entity negotiates. More specifically, it is my contention that the analysis of 
Dasein that Heidegger presents in Being and Time and the type of enactivism that focuses 
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upon autopoiesis both strike a delicate balance between a) emphasising the co-constitution of 
entity and world and b) retaining a view of the entity as a centre of concern. Claim a) refers to 
the insistence, present in both discourses, that entity and world are intertwined and co-
constituting, shaping and defining one another so that neither can be understood as what they 
are – or even be what they are in the first place – in abstraction from the other. For 
enactivism, cogniser and world define one another; the former needs the latter, not only to 
produce the conditions for its existence and survival, but also to be the context against which 
it defines itself as a self-generating unity.5 The latter, meanwhile, is only intelligible as a 
world as well as an environment because it is being navigated by an organism with needs and 
capacities that is capable of the relational meaning-generating process that is cognition.6 This 
picture is, I think, deeply compatible with the way that Heidegger sets out the 
interdependence of Dasein – which, after all, is Being-in-the-world, “is its world” (Heidegger 
2009, 416/364) – and the world whose very worldhood is constituted by relations of 
purposive significance generated by Dasein’s concerns, ends and projects. The second 
component being held in equilibrium, claim b), is based upon both Heideggerian and 
enactivist perspectives maintaining a role for an entity, something whose concerns orient the 
meaning of its world, in their frameworks. For both discourses, there is a centre – not a self, 
an ego, a res cogitans, but a fundamentally world-situated locus of some kind – from which 
meaning-generation proceeds, one that relates to its world and participates in its world’s 
being without being dissolved into it. Autopoietic, adaptive cognition by definition involves 
the self-maintenance and reproduction of a unity, permeable though its border is. Meanwhile, 
it is Dasein’s striving for-the-sake-of-itself that orients worldhood; there is an ineluctable 
nexus, a perspective that is not eliminated or irretrievably dispersed even in the face of its 
ontological entanglement with its world. Both enactivism and early Heideggerian thought 
assert the inseparability of entity and world and reject traditional subject/world oppositions, 
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yet neither takes this to necessitate surrendering the notion that there is a locus or core of 
concern to which the world is significant. 
 The other main conceptual sympathy between Heidegger’s early thought and 
contemporary enactivism that I want to touch upon here is generated by the temporal 
structures operating in both accounts. Proceeding from an extensive Heideggerian exegesis 
that I cannot reproduce here, I have elsewhere defended a reading that ascribes three key 
attributes to the model of temporality which Heidegger sets out in Being and Time. These 
identifying features – which can be summarised under the headings of purposiveness, self-
concern and futurity – can, I have argued, also be traced out in the process of cognition as 
enactivism describes it. I suggest that this connection has the potential to generate significant 
insights and benefits for both participants in the collaboration, a few of which I will mention 
in the next section; before I proceed, though, let me briefly explain what these shared 
temporal features are. 
Firstly, I read the account of Being and Time as suggesting that temporality and 
purposiveness are entwined in an inseparable, mutually-shaping reciprocity, such that neither 
can be fully understood without taking into account the role of the other. I should note that 
this is a somewhat controversial claim, for the standard interpretation takes Heidegger to 
insist upon a unidirectional relation (in which temporality founds purposiveness). I contend, 
however, that there are significant textual and philosophical motivations for adopting a more 
complex, nuanced view. Returning to the features of Heideggerian temporality, the second 
attribute that I ascribe to it is an intrinsic connection to the self-concern of the temporal 
entity, as manifested in the temporal structuration of Dasein’s concern for its own Being and 
striving for-the-sake-of-itself (both of which in turn also permeate and structure Dasein’s 
lived temporality). Finally, I take the temporality of Being and Time to be weighted towards 
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an indeterminate futurity, according a special significance to a radically open-ended 
directedness towards possibility as such.  
As I explain elsewhere in more detail, I think that each of these dimensions of 
Heideggerian temporality can be recognised within the structures of meaning-enacting 
cognition. Autopoietic, adaptive cognition also evinces temporal purposiveness and 
purposive temporality. The enacting system’s self-perpetuating striving is only intelligible 
through integration into a temporal continuum that meaningfully links past and present states 
with future possibilities, even as past, present and future are encountered in terms of the 
connections between problems, means and ends. This enacting cogniser’s temporality is 
structured by the concern that defines it as a self-generating unity directed towards and by its 
own survival, a concern that is itself cashed out as the carrying over of the past entity towards 
further possibilities. Yet the cognising is also defined by its reaching towards an aim – its 
own continuation – that can never definitely arrive or be fully anticipated. Since self-
maintenance requires the precariousness of a continued resistance the possibility of the 
system’s dissolution, final stability only comes with annihilation. The end of self-
perpetuation never arrives, for the struggle towards it can only end with death.  
 There is, of course, much more to be said about the details of this collaboration, 
particularly about the extent and consequences of the continuities that I have posited. This 
brings me to the next section, and the heart of this chapter, for the specific site of tension that 
I will examine is also a prime starting point for fleshing out some of the points that I raise 
above.  
 
2. A problem for Heideggerian enactivism: Dasein and other autopoietic cognisers? 
The challenge to Heideggerian enactivism that I have in mind here arises when we consider 
the kinds of entities to which each perspective tends to apply its analyses. The aspects of 
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Heidegger’s account that come into play in the collaborative venture outlined above are all 
taken to be structures specific to Dasein. Enactivism, meanwhile, attributes meaning-enacting 
cognition to a vast range of systems. While there is some debate about how simple a system 
can be while still classifying as at least minimally cognising (and about just where any of 
these lines should be drawn) it is relatively uncontroversial to say that the class of enacting 
cognisers would embrace far more entities than just those which could be called Dasein. This 
difference creates a significant problem for collaboration between Heideggerian and 
enactivist perspectives. On the one hand, it would seem that a discourse which affirms the 
continuity between simple and complex cognisers would either lie in tension with or be (at 
best) indifferent to a phenomenology that focuses only upon one kind of entity. On the other, 
it also appears to be difficult to reconcile a Heideggerian perspective with the extension of 
the structures he posits in his account to other kinds of entities. Dasein, the Heideggerian 
might worry, has a special role for a reason, and it is unlikely that this could be preserved by 
a more ecumenical re-interpretation of its analyses. 
Considering this issue from either a Heideggerian or an enactivist approach may well 
lead one to simply give up on their cooperation, or at least limit it only to those cases when 
enactivism might be particularly interested in one kind of cognition alone (and prepared to 
draw a hard and fast line between this cogniser and other entities). One reason why one might 
not want to do so immediately, at least if one sees any value in the insights that Heideggerian 
phenomenology can contribute to dialogues with the cognitive or other sciences, is that the 
problem outlined above – the seemingly restricted scope within which Heideggerian analyses 
can be applied – may undermine more and more of these exchanges. While disbanding the 
partnership is always an option, I think it is worth seeing if there is a way that we could have 
at least most of our Heideggerian cake and eat it, too.  
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a. Towards a solution: Extending the structures of Dasein 
One approach that suggests itself here is to contend that Dasein may not necessarily be 
confined to humans alone. While the narrative of Being and Time strongly suggests that 
Dasein belongs primarily to humans, the most explicit and direct statement we get from 
Heidegger in that text is the claim that Dasein is the “entity which each of us is himself”. 
(Heidegger 2009, 27/7) However, he also maintains that ‘Dasein’ is not a synonym for, nor 
equivalent to, ‘human’ or ‘human being’. (ibid. 71/45-75/50) So, it might be possible to 
conceive of the Dasein of Being and Time at least as a set of particular characteristics, with 
any entity that can meet the criteria qualifying as Dasein; even if (and this is a genuinely open 
‘if’) humans have so far been the only ones to do so, there is no need to insist that this will 
continue to be the case.7 While I think that this way of reconceptualising Dasein has merit, it 
also strikes me that it does not get us far enough; the connection between Dasein and entities 
that do not qualify as Dasein needs to be made more explicit. One way of moving further 
along this path, and the kind of response that I shall advocate here, is to argue for the 
extension of Dasein’s fundamental structures, not just beyond humans, but beyond Dasein 
itself, such that other kinds of entities participate in some of these characteristics without 
having to be ‘full-blown’ Dasein. I think it is indeed possible to conceive of some of Dasein’s 
structures being shared by other entities (particularly those which we would today classify as 
cognisers) and, moreover, to do without thereby completely dissolving the special position 
allocated to Dasein, because it remains possible to think of Dasein itself as something like the 
fullest instantiation of all of the structures Heidegger analyses. In my view, the purposive, 
self-concerned and future-weighted model of temporality that I ascribe to Heidegger presents 
itself as the kind of structure that facilitates such a perspective. If we deem it possible that 
versions of these basic structures are shared by all enactive cognisers, then the complexity of 
the way in which they shape, and manifest in, the striving of such organisms could form the 
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basis for a spectrum of temporal complexity, one that we could use to compare and relate 
different kinds of entities. . 
Adopting such a position could ease further collaboration between Heideggerian and 
enactivist discourses. However, as it stands this may also appear to be a one-sided adjustment 
to the former on behalf of the latter in what is after all meant to be a dialogue. If the 
Heideggerian perspective is to be modified along the lines that I have suggested, then we 
might well ask what influence it can in turn have upon its interlocutor. Before I proceed to set 
out the details of the ‘spectrum reading’, then, I want to draw out what I think this take on 
Dasein could offer enactivist approaches.  
 
b. Heideggerian enactivism and the problem of the ‘cognitive gap’ 
One enactivist debate to which I think that my reconceptualization of Dasein’s structures 
might contribute is that dealing with what is often referred to as the problem of the ‘cognitive 
gap’, that is, of accounting for the distinctions between various cognisers while remaining 
within a framework that emphases their continuity.  
Autopoiesis and autonomy were originally conceived by Varela and Maturana as 
features exclusive to the metabolism of single cells, or of very simple organisms at the most; 
both initially resisted the application of these terms to any domains of inquiry outside of 
biology.8 While contemporary enactivism applies these concepts to the definition of cognition 
in general, most of its practitioners maintain a strong emphasis upon autopoiesis establishing 
a continuity between very simple and complex organisms.9  For enactivists, even single-
celled organisms display autopoiesis, which they take to be a necessary condition for 
something to be living entity; that a basic feature of cognition is part of the very definition of 
life itself underlies the “life-mind continuity thesis” prominent in enactivist literature.10 This 
approach faces the challenge of accounting for and organising the differences between the 
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kinds of organisms that it classifies as cognisers. For example, if they are both autopoietic, 
then how can one conceptualise the distinctions between single-celled organisms and humans 
in enactivist terms? The concern here, in the words of Andy Clark, “is that by stressing unity 
and similarity we may lose sight of what is different and distinctive.” (Clark 2001, 118-119)  
The salience of the problem of the cognitive gap to the enactivist approach has 
motivated a number of responses within the discourse, most of which focus upon delineating 
some additional factor or mechanism to explain the varying complexity of cognisers and 
situate the highly advanced capabilities of humans.11 In their paper about the problematic, 
Froese and Di Paolo show that such attempts at finding an additional category for classifying 
cognisers needs to meet two constrains. Firstly, such a factor cannot be so specific to humans 
that it completely undermines the continuity between human cognition and other autopoietic 
systems. (Froese and Di Paolo 2009, 442) Secondly, simply positing what they call “more of 
the same” will not suffice as an answer that can satisfactorily capture the distinctiveness of 
complex cognition; the difference needs to be defined qualitatively, rather than quantitatively 
(such that a human does not just have more of quality x than a bacteria). (ibid., 441)  
 I want to suggest that the conception of Heideggerian temporality that I have 
advanced here and elsewhere can provide enactivism with an additional way of responding to 
the problem of the cognitive gap by offering a classificatory schema for the complexity of 
cognisers. That is, I think that the ways in which the structures of Heideggerian temporality 
(captured in the three features I emphasised earlier) a) resonate in meaning-enacting 
cognition and b) can be extended beyond Dasein and taken to constitute a spectrum of 
temporal complexity along which we can locate both Dasein and non-Dasein entities enable 
us to c) also take that spectrum to be one of cognitive complexity, such that we can describe 
and compare varying levels of cognitive complexity in temporal terms.12 To see how this 
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might work, however, more detail about the nature of this spectrum is needed – a matter to 
which I shall now finally turn.  
 
 
 
c. A Heideggerian schema of temporal and cognitive complexity  
At one end of the range, we would find the simple cognisers whose temporal self-concern 
manifests in the drive to maintain themselves across time, whose relation to futurity is a basic 
striving outwards and a responsiveness to possibilities shaped by their capacities and ends, 
whose temporal purposiveness and purposive temporality manifest in primal, adaptively-
regulated, past-present-future-concerns-means-ends patterns. Moving along the spectrum in 
the direction of increasing complexity, we would see each of these structures framing and 
operating in expanding scopes and levels of detail that mark both quantitative and qualitative 
shifts. The temporal field within which cognisers operate widens. While this broadening can 
relate to quantitatively longer lifespans (although this does not always correlate to cognitive 
complexity, as witnessed by the many organisms that outlive humans), it refers primarily to 
the length and qualitative richness of the projects a cogniser can take up. Increasingly 
temporally complex cognisers can strive towards possibilities that can become more distant, 
with a growing capacity to transcend or balance immediate needs with an eye to ends that 
may be not only further away but encompass an enriched relation of past to future, as the 
former affects the cogniser in different and ever more intricate ways, shaping what it is that is 
to be continued into the future and also what that future means to the cogniser. Projects come 
to be more entwined with one another, with the past-present-future of basic tasks integrating 
into a broader timeline ever more delicately and explicitly. The level of detail and the 
explicitness of a cogniser’s participation in temporality both increase and change in kind. The 
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temporality of a complex cogniser’s meaning enaction can itself become part of the meaning 
that is enacted. The way in which the past is carried over and the range of futures towards 
which a cogniser may strive become more significant and less interchangeable. Cutting off 
certain possibilities may attain a meaning of its own and even lead to regret; the manner in 
which the implicit and explicit influence of the past is taken up, and the tone in which 
projection is carried out, come to matter in themselves. The cogniser can develop a set of 
temporalized priorities that are defined by particular relations between history and projection, 
such that various ends which might otherwise lead to the same end come to be differentiated 
and preferred according to their effect upon, and relation to, self-concern’s meaningful 
stretching towards futurity. These ends themselves, meanwhile, can grow to be 
simultaneously more vague (with open-ended notions of satisfaction affecting the meaning of 
immediate, concrete tasks) and yet more detailed (through the greater potential for intricate 
connections between consequences and possibilities; the multiplication of the ways in which 
past, present and future can interact; and the diversification of the kinds of meaning that 
tasks, goals and futures can have for the cogniser). Here, futurity becomes increasingly 
indeterminate as well as more constrained (as the temporal meaning a cogniser wants to 
manifest divides the paths it needs or wants to take from the ones that it can pursue) and 
threatening (for more is at stake, and that which is at stake is understood as such).   
 At Dasein’s end of the scale, we see a capacity to relate to its entire life as one long 
project, with a striving towards possibilities that may be decades away (or even longer, if an 
individual has grander ambitions) and an ability to relate immediate activities to an extended 
narrative through which Dasein may try to give its past and futures a distinct kind of 
meaning. The valence of the past as past takes in not only personal but also communal and 
even cultural historicity; it shapes, enriches and constrains futurity in dynamic, 
interconnected ways that give Dasein a singular understanding of what is at stake. It can 
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make sense of its preferences of some futures and histories over others in terms that shape 
how it participates in and enacts them. Its future-directed precariousness develops into a 
Being-towards-death that radically alters the meanings it generates and structures the way it 
relates to its self-generating identity.13 Dasein’s purposive temporality and temporal 
purposiveness structure the most complex kinds of practice, enabling it to participate in 
sophisticated linguistic, cultural, historical, social and scientific contexts. Its temporalized 
self-concern reaches its apotheosis in Dasein’s capacity for ontological inquiry, its 
understanding of its Being and the Being of other entities, of Being itself.  
This means that an understanding of the temporality of other cognisers, too, can 
become part of the world of significance that Dasein navigates. As their participation in 
temporality becomes more complex, cognisers can shape and respond to one another’s 
temporality in ever richer ways, encountering others as entities with a self-concerned future-
directedness. Cogniser A might encounter cogniser B as a competitor whose behaviour 
(shaped by its concern for self-perpetuation and its striving to bring its past into its future) 
constrains the possibilities A might encounter, and whose own possibilities A can affect. 
Cogniser C might encounter D as prey meeting a predator; D’s self-perpetuating may come at 
the cost of C’s future and self-concern, influencing the way in which C experiences 
precariousness, while C’s evasive manoeuvres – its striving towards possibilities that 
maintain its identity most effectively – constrain the possibilities towards which D can strive, 
the meaning that it navigates and responds to. Several cognisers might encounter one another 
as collaborators, capable of participating in a shared project and manifesting a communal 
history, whose interactions enrich and complicate the possibilities towards which each may 
strive. Higher level cognisers (such as Dasein) would have the capacity to understand what is 
at stake in each of these encounters explicitly, and to do so in temporal terms; such a cogniser 
can recognise another cogniser’s future as a future that matters to it because of its self-
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concern, it can see another’s past as that which must be related to in a particular way for that 
cogniser to remain itself. A cogniser like Dasein can relate its own temporal participation to 
that of cognisers both like and unlike itself, and can understand how it shapes them even as 
they shape it explicitly, with its temporality mattering to it in a way that is itself entwined 
with the temporal structuration of its self-concern.  
In this way, Heideggerian temporality provides a spectrum or ‘factor’ for classifying 
cognitive complexity that establishes a radical continuity through the shared participation in 
temporal structures across the entire range of cognisers without slipping into a schema that 
only posits ‘more of the same’. Dasein is not just ‘more self-concerned’ or ‘more futural’ or 
‘more purposive’ than more basic cognisers; each of these temporal (and temporality-
shaping) features is also qualitatively different. There is a significant distinction between, for 
example, basic temporalized self-concern and Dasein’s capacity for ontology; nonetheless, 
both participate in, and are shaped and enabled by, the same temporal structuration.  
I would also suggest – though I cannot set this out this in detail here – that this 
spectrum of temporal complexity integrates particularly well with one of the most significant 
contemporary enactivist responses to the problem of the cognitive gap, namely, the sociality-
based account put forward by Froese and Di Paolo (drawing upon their previous work with 
De Jaegher). This approach argues that even basic cognisers can radically expand the 
meanings generated by the navigation of their worlds simply through contact with other such 
entities, an effect that is then progressively amplified by the sophistication of interactions and 
the different possibilities for communication. The “difference between the sense-making 
capabilities of a simple single-cell organism and that of a fully developed human agent” can 
then, for Froese and Di Paolo, be largely attributed to the increased range of options and 
meanings available through more complex forms of intersubjectivity. It seems to me that this 
view invites an exploration of the temporal dimension of sociality, and that such a 
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development could enrich the current discourse.14  I would even suggest that sociality and 
temporality are linked in a way that means the latter is crucial to explaining how the former 
operates. Recall, for example, Cogniser A and Cogniser B, who compete for resources. It 
seems to me that in order to view them as socially linked systems, rather than just cognisers 
who exist alongside each other without affecting one another’s enaction and navigation of 
meaning, we need to be able to say that they can shape one another’s futures and that, if they 
do so over time, they have a shared past. Cogniser B’s behaviour may change if Cogniser A 
does something, but to render that intelligible as an example of sociality, this change needs to 
be appreciated in temporal terms as Cogniser A constraining the future possibilities of 
Cogniser B. They have a relationship to each other in virtue of their temporal self-concern, of 
their respective needs to continue their pasts into their respective futures impacting upon one 
another, whether through direct or indirect contact. The increasing complexity of these 
relations – in communal and cultural terms – itself moves along a temporal axis, as each level 
of social complexity is marked by a distinct relation to historicity, to the meaning that a 
shared past can have, and to the ways this can both generate and curtail possibilities and 
projects.  
 
d. Friction, negotiation, dialogue 
While the proposal detailed here may ease the conditions for collaboration between the 
discourses, it may seem like an overly radical departure from the Heideggerian account upon 
which it is founded. However, I would suggest that, with further work, it can preserve enough 
of the special place that Heidegger’s account assigns to Dasein whilst leaving itself open to 
changing insights about the nature of the distinction between humans and non-humans. There 
are significant qualitative differences between Dasein’s temporal structuration and the 
manifestation of temporal structures in simpler cognisers giving Dasein a special place in the 
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spectrum of cognition This may not be sufficient for the concerned Heideggerian, but I think 
that the question of whether we gain or lose more by extending the scope of the analysis of 
Dasein in this way at the very least remains an open one. Compare the theory of autopoiesis; 
that its original restrictions of scope could neither contain the insights it generated nor hold 
back the flood of varied and novel applications enriched, rather than undermined, the 
discourse. While the stakes are different in the Heideggerian case, the outcome need not be; it 
is not unfathomable to consider that the early Heidegger was right about at least some of the 
structures that constitute Dasein, but not about the range of entities to which they could be 
gainfully applied.15 
  This is not to say, however, that approximating Heidegger’s views about the non-
human/human distinction (whatever we may take them to be) as closely as possible should be 
the ultimate goal here; I am not suggesting an enactivist apologetics that can make room for 
all aspects of Heidegger’s account. /Rather, I think that, where there are significant tensions 
between Heideggerian and enactivist perspectives on this matter, the latter gives us reason to 
challenge, interrogate and revise the former. Here, we find ourselves at a point where the 
notion of phenomenology and cognitive science informing one another can become both 
radical and concrete. I am not suggesting that we reject Heidegger’s claims about the 
exclusivity of Dasein purely because a type of cognitive science contends that we need to; I 
do not believe that this is how the dialogue between the disciplines should proceed. The 
challenge to Heidegger’s exclusivism with respect to the structures of Dasein comes from 
both within and beyond the Heideggerian perspective. On the one hand, it is the applicability 
and profound resonance of the structures that Heidegger’s account posits which itself 
demands their extension beyond Dasein. On the other hand, the problem of the cognitive gap 
is a salient example of the way in which Heideggerian phenomenology and contemporary 
cognitive science can enrich one another through the challenges they pose to each other. 
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Although I have suggested that we should question it, Heidegger’s insistence that the 
structures he describes are unique to Dasein nonetheless provides a new perspective from 
which to take the problem of the cognitive gap seriously, offering us further reasons why a 
model of cognition such as enactivism needs to respond to the challenge of incorporating the 
qualitative differences between basic organisms and higher-order cognisers (which I think it 
can, as I have shown). Conversely, the very possibility that Heideggerian temporality does 
offer us a way of responding to that challenge on behalf of enactivism precisely because it 
constitute a schema of both continuity and distinction between simpler cognisers and Dasein 
gives us grounds on which to reinterpret and question Heidegger’s own seeming exclusivism. 
Enactivism offers us motivation for extending Heidegger’s account beyond the bounds that it 
stipulates for itself because it shows how the concepts articulated within that account apply in 
ways that the latter did not originally posit. I think that this enhances, rather than violates, 
Heidegger’s framework (although I concede that exegetical violence may be necessary 
sometimes), for the wide applicability of its concepts is surely a point in favour of their 
usefulness and continued salience; new uses for Heideggerian concepts suggest that they can 
still generate new insights. A Heideggerian model of temporality, then, intersects with 
enactive models of cognition in a way that expands the latter’s possible responses to the 
problem of the cognitive gap, while at the same time providing impetus for a re-evaluation of 
some aspects of Heidegger’s own account, illustrating how a dialogue between these fields 
can work towards productive friction.   
 
3. Concluding remarks  
This chapter briefly summarised the case for a collaboration between early Heideggerian 
phenomenology and enactivist cognitive science, before considering how such a venture 
might reconcile significant differences in the way that each discourse applies the structures it 
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discusses. There is, of course, much more work to be done; my discussion here provides only 
a very rough sketch of a much broader project, one that deals with many sources of tension 
beyond the one that I have begun addressing here. Nonetheless, I hope to have suggested why 
the integration of Heideggerian and enactivist perspectives is worth pursuing further, and that 
it has the potential resources for approaching conflicts between these interlocutors in a 
productive, rather than destructive, manner. 
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1 This previous work can be found in “Being-in-the-world, Temporality and Autopoiesis”, 
Parrhesia: A Journal of Critical Philosophy 24 (2015): 261-284; and my doctoral 
dissertation, “Dasein’s Temporal Enaction: Heideggerian Temporality in Dialogue with 
Contemporary Cognitive Science” (PhD diss., The University of Melbourne 2015). I should 
note here that a) Section 1 of this paper summarises, but does not exactly reproduce, many of 
the aforementioned paper’s main arguments; and that b) the rest of this chapter is derived 
from (previously unpublished) parts of Chapter 8 of my dissertation. 
2 The following discussion applies to that part of enactivist discourse (exemplified by the 
work of e.g. Ezequiel Di Paolo and Evan Thompson) which focuses on autopoietic, adaptive 
cognition. I am not referring to the recent Radically Enactive Cognition movement, nor to the 
perception-focussed work of Noë (to which Thompson has also contributed).  
3 For a further analysis of enactivism’s philosophical roots, see T. Froese and T. Ziemke, 
"Enactive Artificial Intelligence: Investigating the Systemic Organization of Life and Mind," 
Artificial Intelligence 173, no. 3-4 (2009): 476-484; Evan Thompson, Mind in Life: Biology, 
Phenomenology, and the Science of Mind (Cambridge, MA: The Bellknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2007): 149-157; and Andreas Weber and Francisco J. Varela, “Life After 
Kant: Natural Purposes and the Autopoietic Foundations of Biological Individuality,” 
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1, no. 2 (2002): 109-114. 
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4 Heidegger’s praise here is tempered by his rejection of von Uexküll’s insistence upon the 
continuity between humans and other animals, a point that foreshadows the problematic I 
discuss later in the chapter. 
5 My discussion of enactivism here and throughout this chapter draws primarily on key 
accounts such as: Ezequiel Di Paolo, "Autopoiesis, Adaptivity, Teleology, Agency,” 
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4, no. 4 (2006): 429-452; Froese and Ziemke, 
"Enactive Artificial Intelligence,"; Thompson, Mind in Life; Francisco J. Varela, "Patterns of 
Life: Intertwining Identity and Cognition," Brain and Cognition 34, no. 1 (6/1997): 72-87; 
and Francisco J. Varela, Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch, The Embodied Mind: Cognitive 
Science and Human Experience (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1991). 
6 This raises the question of whether these resonances extend to the most basic systems that 
enactivism investigates. It is worth noting that there is much debate within enactivism about 
how to cash out the life-mind continuity and how to view the kind of enrichment that renders 
life cognitive, meaning that the framework for asking this is not yet settled enough to 
determine an answer either way. ‘How far down’ we can find purposive, concerned and 
future-weighted temporality is arguably an empirical issue which calls for further 
investigation. 
7 This position is harder to reconcile with works like the Letter on Humanism and The 
Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, but a comparative analysis of these with BT is 
beyond the scope of this chapter. I think one could read Heidegger’s distinctions between 
lacking a world, being poor in world and Being-in-the-world as reflecting something like the 
spectrum of complexity I propose later, something I try to do elsewhere. Here, however, I am 
more interested in recovering the insights that can be generated if we modify the framework 
of Being and Time a little than in retaining every part of its analyses.  
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8 Varela explains his original stance and the development of his work towards cognitive 
science in “Preface to the second edition of De Máquinas y Seres Vivos - Autopoiesis: La 
Organización de lo Vivo,” trans. Alberto Paucar-Caceres, Roger Harnden and Karina 
Cornejo, Systems Research and Behavioral Science 28, no. 6 (2011): 601-617ff. 
9 See Froese and Ziemke’s history of this development in “Enactive Artificial Intelligence”, 
476-484. 
10 See, for example, Thompson’s account in Mind and Life, and Di Paolo’s work in 
“Autopoiesis”, 429-452ff. The term is used throughout the literature. 
11 T. Froese and Ezequiel Di Paolo, "Sociality and the Life-Mind Continuity Thesis," 
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8, no. 4 (2009): 441-442. 
12 Connecting temporality to cognitive complexity is not unheard of; there is, for example, 
much interesting research into different cognisers’ relation to the future. Two comprehensive 
overviews of such work can be found in C.R. Raby and N.S. Clayton, “Prospective cognition 
in animals,” Behavioural Process 80, no. 3 (2009): 314-324; and T. Suddendorf and M.C. 
Corballis. “The evolution of foresight: What is mental time travel, and is it unique to 
humans?” Behavioural and Brain Sciences 30, no. 3 (2007): 299-313, 345-351. Whilst 
neither study’s conception of futurity is equivalent to mine, I think that there are 
opportunities for further collaboration here.  
13 These descriptions may remind the reader of Heidegger’s account of authenticity. The 
advent of Being-towards-death is what I would (with deliberate oversimplification) call one 
of the ‘existential complications’ encountered by a cogniser of Dasein’s temporal complexity. 
14 This is further suggested by Di Paolo’s own emphasis upon the temporal dimension of 
enactive cognition. For him, there is “a minimum temporal granularity in adaptivity” (444, 
original italics) that is necessary to account for the ways in which “the ongoing coupling with 
the environment, and the precariousness of metabolism, make their collective action also self-
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renewing, thus naturally resulting in valenced rhythms of tension and satisfaction.” (444-445, 
original italics) I think that this is just the kind of account that can enter into dialogue with a 
Heideggerian model of temporality as inherently purposive, self-concerned and futural, one 
that is thick enough to accommodate and account for valence and can connect self-concern 
with future-directedness in a way that makes sense of precariousness.  
15 Thanks to Richard Sebold for inspiring this way of articulating the idea.  
